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This article discusses joinder and severance of defendants. A subsequent article examines the joinder and sev:lerance of offenses. See generally 2 Katz & Giannelli,
r Cb8aldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law ch. 58 (1996).
~ Criminal Rule 8 governs joinder of defendants in one in~()lictment, information, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the
consolidation for trial of defendants when there is more than
one indictment, information, or complaint. Finally, Rule 14
governs severance of defendants. The importance of joinder cannot be overestimated. As one commentator has
noted:
The way in which the prosecutor chooses to combine
offenses or defendants in a single indictment is perhaps second in importance only to his decision to
prosecute. Whether a defendant is tried en masse with
many other participants in an alleged crime, or in a
separate trial of his own, will often be decisive of the
outcome. Equally decisive may be the number of offenses which are cumulated against a single defendant, particularly if they are unconnected. 8 Moore's
Federal Practice 8-3 (Cipes ed. 1993).

I

JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS: RULE 8(B)
Criminal Rule 8(8) provides that defendants may be
prosecuted under the same indictment, information, or complaint if they are alleged to have participated (1) in the same
criminal act, transaction, or series of acts or transactions, or
(2) in the same course of criminal conduct. The Rule further
specifies that these defendants may be charged in each
count separately or together and that all of the joined defendants need not be charged in each count.
Joinder of Offenses
Rule 8(8) differs from Rule 8(A), which governs joinder of
offenses, in one important respect. Rule B(A) permits the
joinder of offenses that "are of the same or similar character:· A comparable provision relating to the joinder of defendants does not appear in Rule 8(8); defendants may be
tried together only if they are alleged to have participated
(1) in the same acts or transactions or (2) in the same
course of criminal conduct. Moreover, Rules 8(A) and 8(8)

operate independently of each other. Thus, if X has committed one robbery by himself and a second robbery withY, all
charges cannot be tried at one time because Y did not participate in the first robbery. The prosecutor could try X alone
for both robberies by joining offenses under Rule B(A), in
which caseY would be tried separately for the second robbery. Alternatively, X andY could be tried jointly under Rule
8(8) for the second robbery, in which case X would be tried
alone for the first robbery.
MULTIPLE INDICTMENTS & COMPLAINTS: RULE 13
As discussed above, Rule 8(8) prescribes tests for joinder in a single indictment, information, or complaint.
Criminal Rule 13 governs joinder where there is more than
one indictment, information, or complaint.
Rule 13 is broken into two paragraphs which are almost
identical in wording. The first paragraph authorizes the
court to order "two or more indictments or informations or
both to be tried together:• Paragraph two provides the same
procedure for combining multiple complaints for misdemeanors in courts of inferior jurisdiction. In each, consolidation is permissive and authorized only if the defendants
could have been joined in a single indictment or information
(paragraph one) or in a single complaint (paragraph two).
The tests for determining whether joinder of defendants is
proper are found in Rule 8(8).
The final provision of both paragraph one and two requires that the procedure be the "same as if the prosecution
were under a single indictment, information, [or complaint]:'
"Procedure" is not defined. Presumably, it refers to mechanical aspects of trial such as the number of peremptory challenges.
SEVERANCE: RULE 14
Criminal Rule 14 provides that when two or more defendants have been properly joined in an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to Rule 8(8) and it appears that
the defendant or the state is prejudiced by the joinder, the
court may grant severance of defendants or provide appropriate relief.
The decision to grant severance falls within the trial

"--'thief Public Defender James A. Draper
Telephone (216) 443-7223
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office,
100 Lakeside Place, 1200 W. 3rd Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender.
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court's discretion. As one court stated,
It is axiomatic that the granting of separate trials for
codefendants is a matter for the discretion of the trial
judge .... Absent some abuse of discretion, to be
demonstrated by a clear showing of prejudice and the
consequent denial of a fair trial, the determination is
not subject to reversal. State v. Perod, 15 Ohio App.2d
115, 120, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968).
See also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993)
("Rule 14 leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and
any remedy that may be necessary to the sound discretion
of the district courts.").
In this context, prejudice may arise in different circumstances: (1) where a defendant wants to call a codefendant
as a witness, (2) where two defendants have antagonistic
defenses, (3) where the danger of guilt by association is
present, (4) where the complexity of the case may make it
difficult for the jury to separate the evidence for each defendant, and (5) where a codefendant's confession implicating
the defendant is offered at trial. These circumstances are
discussed below. They are not, however, exhaustive.

defense as one in which a defendant seeks to exculpate
himself by blaming his codefendant. State v. Daniels, 92
Ohio App.3d 473, 636 N.E.2d 336 (1993). Conflicting defenses, however, do not necessarily mandate severance.
The problem presented by antagonistic defenses is illus- ~V
trated by Deluna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 143 (5th
'
.t
Cir. 1962), in which two defendants were tried jointly for narcotics offenses. One of the defendants, Gomez, moved for
severance prior to trial, but the motion was denied.
Although the second defendant, Deluna, did not testify at
trial, Gomez took the stand and blamed Deluna for the offense. In closing argument, Gomez's counsel commented
that "at least one man was honest enough and had courage
enough to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination .... You haven't heard a word from [Deluna]."
This tactic apparently worked - Gomez was acquitted and
Deluna convicted. On appeal, the Fifth Circuif reversed.
The court believed that Gomez's attorney had acted properly; "his attorney should be free to draw all rational inferences
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an attorney is free to comment on the effect of any interested
party's failure to produce material evidence in his possession or to call witnesses who have knowledge of pertinent
facts." Nevertheless, from Deluna's perspective, the comments prejudiced the exercise of his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent. This conflict could have been avoided; the
court noted, "for each of the defendants to see the face of
Justice they must be tried separately:• Deluna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140, 155 (5th Cir. 1962).
Other examples of antagonistic defenses include: People
v. Hurst, 396 Mich. 1, 9, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1976) Ooint trial
i
improper because one defendant "would testify to exculpate " .···. i
herself and incriminate [the other]"); Murray v. State, 528
~J))~ / (
P.2d 739, 740 (Okla. Crim. 1974) ("Denial of a severance in
·
the instant case resulted in pitting defendant against co-deI
fendant:'); People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839,
.
842 (1936) ("Any set of circumstances which is sufficient to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial if tried jointly with another
is sufficient to require a separate trial.").
In State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 124 n. 22, 47
N.E.2d 482 (1969), the court of appeals observed: "[l]t is
easy to imagine further complications in a consolidated trial.
For example, suppose one defendant takes the stand and
the other does not. Is the failure to testify subject to comment by the lawyer for the testifying codefendant?"
Although the court did not have to answer this question to
decide that case, it did give some inkling as to how it would
have decided the issue when it stated: ''This court unanimously disapproves the consolidation as not consonant with
good practice in criminal trials:· ld. at 123.
In Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 543 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court held that a severance was not required merely because antagonistic defenses are raised.
Charged with distributing drugs, Zafiro claimed that she was
merely the girlfriend of Martinez, another defendant, and
knew nothing of the drugs. Martinez argued that he was
merely visiting his girlfriend, Zafiro, and had no idea that
she was involved in distributing drugs. The Court wrote:
''There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of
d_efendan_ts who ~re. indi_cte? together. Joint trials 'play a . ~\ ;) ' L
v1tal role 1n the cnmmal JUStice system.' They promote eff1~ciency and 'serve the interests of justice by avoiding the
scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts."' ld. at 539 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987)). The
Court went on to hold:
1

CODEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
In some cases a defendant has been prejudiced because
a joint trial precluded the calling of codefendants who could
have provided exculpatory evidence. A leading case is
United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965),
in which the defendant was charged with suborning perjury,
impeding the administration of justice, and conspiracy.
Echeles's codefendant had previously testified in another
trial that Echeles was not involved in the events upon which
the present charges were based. Echeles moved for a severance so that the codefendant would testify in his behalf.
The trial court denied the motion;·the Seventh Circuit reversed. Under the circumstances of the case, the court
found that (1) the trial court could have ordered the codefendant tried first, and (2) Echeles "should not be foreclosed of
the possibility that [the codefendant] would testify in his behalf" merely because the codefendant might claim his Fifth
Amendment privilege even if separate trials were ordered.
The burden is significant in this respect: the defendant
must specify not only that the codefendant will be called as
a witness but also the purpose sought by calling the codefendant. A mere allegation that the defendant contemplates
calling a codefendant is insufficient. See State v. Perod, 15
Ohio App.2d 115, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968) (any prejudice resulting from a joint trial is merely speculative). Thus, counsel should disclose the exculpatory effect of the codefendant's anticipated testimony as well as the basis for believing why the codefendant would testify if severance is granted. Where an appellant in his motion for severance states,
however, that each defendant might decide to call the other
as a witness, but does not, such a ground is purely hypothetical and fails to establish actual prejudice. State v.
Warren, No. 86AP-127 (1Oth Dist. Ct. App., 10-9-86).
ANTAGONISTIC DEFENSES
Severance may be sought where there are conflicting defenses and strategies. See 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal
Procedure§ 17.3 (1985). "[l]t has long been the view that
defendants joined for trial should be granted a severance
whenever their defenses are antagonistic to each other."
ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 41
(1968). One court of appeals has defined an antagonistic
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Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per
s.e. Moreover, Rule 14 does not require severance
even if prejudice is shown; rather it leaves the tailoring
of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's
sound discretion ....

Similarly, in United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1976), one of the Watergate defendants was tried
along with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell. His alleged
participation in the Watergate coverup was minor compared
to that of the more well-known codefendants. On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit reversed because Mardian's motion to sever
was not granted. The court commented: "Particularly where
there is a great disparity in the weight of the evidence,
strongly establishing the guilt of some defendants, the danger persists that guilt will improperly 'rub off' on the others."
In contrast, where an appellant argued in support of his
motion for severance that his codefendant's criminal record
would probably be introduced during the trial and would
prejudice the jury against him, such an argument does not
affirmatively show that appellant will be prejudiced by the
joint tria!. State v. Dozanti, No. 1640 (11th Dist. Ct. App., 1121-86).

[W]hen defendants properly have been joined under
Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance
under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of
the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Such a risk
might occur when evidence that the jury should not
consider against a defendant and that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted
against a codefendant. !d. at 538-39.
As examples, the Court cited cases where a codefendant's
wrongdoing could lead a jury to convict the defendant, a
complex case with markedly different degrees of culpability,
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), or where a
codefendant's confession implicated the defendant. Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968).
In sum, severance is required only if a trial right is involved or there is a risk of an unreliable verdict. In addition,
"less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often
will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice" and "defendants are
not entitled to severance merely because they may have a
better chance of acquittal in separate trials:· Zafiro v. United
States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
Furthermore, mere hostility between defendants is not
enough to necessitate separate trials. In deciding whether
grant a severance, the trial judge must balance the possible prejudice to the defendant against the government's interest in judicial economy and must consider ways in which
the prejudice can be lessened by other means. See State v.
Brooks, No. 9190 (2d Dist. Ct. App., 6-4-87). Nor is the simple assertion of different defenses enough to necessitate
separate trials. A murder defendant who intends to raise an
alibi defense which would make his case different from his
codefendant's does not establish prejudice resulting from a
denial of severance where the defendant does not assert
the alibi defense at trial. State v. Robles, 65 Ohio App.3d
104, 583 N.E.2d 318 (1989).

COMPLEXITY
Where the number of charges and defendants is so numerous that the jury will be incapable of distinguishing the
evidence and applying the law to each defendant separately, a severance should be granted. "When many defendants
are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is
heightened." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539
(1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,77475 (1946)).
United States v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 262, 263 (W.D.N.Y.
1960), illustrates this problem. The trial court granted a severance, stating:
The complex involvement of the various defendants
and the multiplicity of charges contained in the indictment would render it difficult, if not impossible, for the
court to adequately charge a jury as to the applicable
law with respect to each defendant and for the jury to
apply that law intelligently in reaching verdicts on the
many charges involved.
City of Cincinnati v. Reichman, 27 Ohio App.2d 125, 272
N.E.2d 904 (1974), also illustrates this point. The defendant
was charged along with three others for disorderly conduct
but was not charged, as were the other codefendants, with
aiding and abetting. All charges arose out of a civil protest.
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a separate
trial, which the appellate court concluded was an abuse of
discretion. The transcript of testimony was 1 ,291 pages;
photographs were received in evidence depicting scenes of
many individuals and groups of individuals which had no relationship to the defendant's charge of disorderly conduct.
The appellate court determined that the jury would have
great difficulty in determining which portion of the evidence
applied to the individual charge against the defendant.
See also State v. Parker, 72 Ohio App.3d 456, 594
N.E.2d 1033 (1991) (where evidence relevant to each of
three co-defendants is direct and uncomplicated, so that the
jury is capable of segregating the proof as to each defendant, the trial court's failure to sever defendant's trial was
not error; moreover, defendant's testimony that he was left
uncertain as to whether he should testify at a joint trial failed
to establish that non-severance prejudiced his rights because all defendant has asserted is that better trial tactics
existed if the trial was severed), dismissed, jurisdictional
motion overruled, 61 Ohio St.3d 1418,574 N.E.2d 1090
(1991 ).

·oo
>-

GUILT BY ASSOCIATION
In some cases the accumulation of evidence against one
defendant may spill over on other defendants, resulting in a
conviction of the latter even though the evidence against
that defendant is weak or marginal - in short, guilt by association. "By a joint trial of such separate offenses, a subtle
bond is likely to be created between the several defendants
though they have never met nor acted in unison; prejudice
within the meaning of Rule 14 is implicit." Shaffer v. United
States, 362 U.S. 511, 532 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The issue is whether the evidence as to each defendant is
direct and uncomplicated and the jury is capable of segregating the proof as to each defendant. State v. Parker, 72
Ohio App.3d 456,594 N.E.2d 1033 (1991).
l
In United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 756 (2d Cir. 1965)
'(citing Fed. R. 14), cert. denied, 384 US. 947 (1966), the
Second Circuit reversed a conviction on this ground, commenting that severance should have been granted "the moment it
appeared that [the defendant] was likely to be prejudiced by the
accumulation of evidence of wrongdoing by his codefendant."

3

I'
!!

,,/i
·I

!I

I

CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSION (BRUTON RULE)
In Bruton v. United States; 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the prosecution in a joint trial sought to introduce the confession of
one defendant, which inculpated Bruton, another defendant.
The government contended that a limiting instruction directing the jury not to use the confession against Bruton provided sufficient protection. The United States Supreme Court,
however, found the limiting instruction inadequate.
According to the Court,
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant,
that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored .... Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused
side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial. ld. at 135-36
Since the Court found the instruction ineffective and the accomplice did not take the stand, the Court ruled that Bruton
had been denied the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation because the right to cross-examine the codefendant
about the statement had been foreclosed. In Roberts v.
Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), the Bruton principle was
made applicable to the states. See also State v. Moritz, 63
Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980).
The Ohio courts had addressed this issue prior to Bruton.
The court of appeals recognized as long ago as 1942 that
the general rule is "that where one of several defendants
jointly indicted has made admissions or confessions implicating others, a severance should be ordered unless the attorney for the state declares that such admissions or confessions will not be offered in evidence on the trial:' State v.
?hater, 71 Ohio App. 1, 7, 47 N.E.2d 669 (1942). Similarly,
m State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 342, 86 N.E.2d 24
(1949), the Ohio Supreme Court referred to the "prejudicial
effect" of such a confession on the defendant as constituting
good cause under the severance statute. After noting that
limiting instructions are often ineffective in these situations
the Court found that the "prejudicial matter should be stricken out or deleted before the confession is admitted in evidence:•
The Ohio rule stated in Rosen is broader than the constit~tional principle of Bruton, because the necessary prejudice does not depend on a failure of confrontation. If an
Ohio judge knows that the state intends to use the confession of a codefendant which contains matter prejudicial to
the other defendant in a joint trial, it is an abuse of discretion
not to grant a severance. The emphasis in Rosen is on the
effect of the confession on the jury. "[l]n many cases the admission of such ex parte statements creates impressions so
adverse that they may not be eradicated from the minds of
the members of the jury:• State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339,
342, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949).

ruled that coconspirator statements automatically satisfy the
reliability requirement imposed by the Confrontation Clause
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), and that the'
unavailability of the declarant need not be established as a
condition for admitting coconspirator statements. United
-..c:-,,
States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
~,)I'
1

Exclusion
In addition to severance, there are several ways to avoid
the Bruton problem. Excluding the evidence is a possibility,
but a rather unattractive one from the prosecution's perspective.

Redaction
The Bruton problem may be avoided if the prosecution
can delete (redact) all references in the confession that relate to the codefendant. See Bruton v. United States 391
U.S. 123, 134 n. 10 (1976); State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio' st.
339, 342, 86 N.E.2d 24 (1949). See also United States v.
Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[A] redacted
statement in which the names of co-defendants are replaced by neutral pronouns, with no indication to the jury
that the original statement contained actual names, and
where the statement standing alone does not otherwise
connect co-defendants to the crimes, may be admitted without violating a co-defendant's Bruton rights:'), cert. denied,
493 u.s. 1081 (1990).
Redaction, however, is not always effective. "There are, of
course, instances in which such editing is not possible; the
references to the codefendant may be so frequent or so
closely interrelated with references to the maker's conduct
that little would be left of the statement after editing." ABA
Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance 38 (1967).
___
Indeed, su~h editing of ~he confession may only serve to
''ilJJi I
draw attent1on to the obJect of the censorship. See Hodges
1
v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub.
nom., Lewis v. Rose, 436 U.S. 909 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court sanctioned the redaction procedure in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
Marsh was present during a robbery and murder. A witness
testified about her conduct during the crime, indicating that
Marsh, along with two others, was an active participant.
The confession of her codefendant, Williams was then admitted in evidence. This confession was red~cted to omit all
reference to Marsh. Indeed, it omitted all reference to anyone o~her than Williams and Martin, the third alleged accomplice, who was a fugitive at the time of the trial. Marsh
testified in her own defense. She admitted being present at
the scene but denied any prior knowledge that the crime
would occur. Her testimony, however, placed her in a car
with Williams and Martin just prior to the crime and
Williams's confession indicated that the crime .:Vas discu_s~ed ~t that tim~. The trial court instructed the jury that
Williams s confession could be considered only when determining Williams's guilt.
The Supreme Court commented: "We hold that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a
~ontest!fying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting
mstruct1on when, as here, the confession is redacted to
eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference
~ ;)) ;
to her e~istence:' ld. a_t 21 ~. In Bruton the codefendant's
confession expressly Implicated Bruton as the accomplice.
,_
In contrast, the codefendant's confession on its face did not
implicate Marsh. Marsh was linked to the confession only
through other evidence admitted at trial, i.e., her own testimony. The Court held that "evidentiary linkage" or "contextu1

limitations
Bruton does not apply to bench trials where there is no
jury to be misled. See State v. Doherty, 56 Ohio App.2d
112, 381 N.E.2d 960 (1978). Moreover, the codefendant's
confession in Bruton was clearly inadmissible under the
hearsay rule as to Bruton. See Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1976). If a codefendant's confession falls
within a recognized hearsay exception, such as the coconspirators exemption, Evid. R. 801 (D)(2)(e), there is no confrontation violation. The United States Supreme Court later
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al implication" does not present the potential for jury disregard of the limiting instruction that underlies the Bruton decision:
In short, while it may not always be simple for the
members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist
the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so
that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the general rule. ld. at 208.
In addition, the Court cited the practical difficulties of adopting a different rule. A redacted confession can be reviewed
prior to trial, but assessing "evidentiary linkage" prior to trial
is often impossible.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio
St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980), held that Bruton should
be applied to a!! statements that tend to incriminate a codefendant, whether or not that defendant is actually named in
the statement. The United States Supreme Court in
Richardson, however, declined to go as far as Moritz and
declined to apply Bruton to a statement that was not incriminating on its face but was so only when linked with other
trial testimony. In State v. Laird, 65 Ohio App.3d 113, 583
N.E.2d 323 (1989), a court of appeals followed Richardson
and not Moritz.

brother, Benjamin, for the death of a gas station attendant.
Benjamin's confession, which implicated Eulogio, was admitted at trial.
The Court held:
Where a nontestifying codefendant's confession facially incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible
against defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its
admission at the joint trial, even if the jury is instructed
not to consider it against defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him.
This case is indistinguishable from Bruton with respect
to those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this
area: the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, ... the probability that such disregard will
have a devastating effect, ... and the determinability
of these facts in advance of trial ....
Rebuttal
In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985), which involved a burglary-murder allegedly perpetrated by the defendant and an accomplice, the Court ruled that Bruton was
not violated by the prosecution's use of an accomplice's
statement in rebuttal. One defendant claimed that he was
forced to sign a confession that mirrored that of his codefendant. The prosecution was allowed to admit the codefendant's confession for the nonhearsay purpose of illustrating
the dissimilarities between the two confessions and thus to
discredit the defendant's claim. Chief Justice Burger concluded that the limiting instruction adequately protected the
defendant's legitimate interest in ensuring that the confession was not misused by the jury, and "unlike the situation in
Bruton, ... there were no alternatives that would have both
assured the integrity of the trial's truth-seeking function and
eliminated the risk of the jury's improper use of evidence:'
ld. at 415.
Since the sheriff who took both statements was available
at trial for questioning, the Court ruled that a Bruton issue
was not involved. "In short, the State's rebuttal witness
against the [the defendant] was not [his accomplice], but
[the sheriff]:' ld. at 414.

Codefendant Testimony
The Bruton problem is avoided, at least in some in-

(

stances, if the codefendant testifies at trial. Under these circumstances, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant on the accuracy of the out-of-court
statement, thereby obviating the confrontation issue. The
United States Supreme Court took this position in Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1971 ): "We conclude that
where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense,
denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating
the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has
been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments." See also State v. Doherty, 56
Ohio App.2d 112, 381 N.E.2d 960 (1978).
The Nelson rationale is inapplicable where both defendants are represented by the same attorney because in
such a case cross-examination of the testifying codefendant
would present a conflict of interests. See Courtney v. United
States, 486 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1973); Holland v. Henderson,
460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).

Harmless Error
Bruton issues are subject to the harmless error doctrine.
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (the other
evidence against the accused was so overwhelming that the
denial of the constitutional right in that instance was harmless); State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150, 407 N.E.2d 1268
(1980); State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.2d 167,255 N.E.2d 861
(1970); State v. Parsons, 18 Ohio App.2d 123, 123 n. 1, 247
N.E.2d 482 (1969).

Interlocking Confessions
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of interlocking confessions in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73
(1979). Unlike Bruton, Parker had also confessed. The plurality opinion in Parker distinguished Bruton: ''The right protected in Bruton -the 'constitutional right of cross-examination, ... has far less practical value to a defendant who
has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a
codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely
yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged:' Consequently, the plurality found the Bruton rule inapplicable.
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected the interlocking
confession doctrine, as espoused in Parker, finding the introduction of a nontestifying codefendant's confession violative of the Confrontation Clause. In Cruz v. New York, 481
U.S. 186 (1987), Eulogio Cruz was tried along with his

CAPITAL CASES
Where two or more persons are jointly indicted for a capital offense, Criminal Rule 14 provides that severance is automatic. In effect, this provision presumes prejudice in joint
trials of capital offenses. Joinder of defendants requires a
motion by the prosecution or one of the defendants and approval by the court for good cause shown. The burden of
establishing good cause rests on the prosecutor. See State
v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44,446 N.E.2d 436 (1983); State
Abbott, 152 Ohio St. 228,89 N.E.2d 147 (1949); State v.
Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154,279 N.E.2d 616 (1971). This
provision follows R.C. Section 2945.20 and thus, cases interpreting that provision are still persuasive authority.
Good cause for joinder in capital cases must meet a
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higher standard than that usually applied in support of joint
trials. As theOhioSupreme.Courtnotedin Statev. Abbott,
152 Ohio St. 228, 236, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949):
[G]ood cause must necessarily be some operative factor not present in every case of joint indictments of defendants in capital cases. For instance, the additional
time and labor required of the state or court, or the expense to the state, made necessary by separate trials,
cannot be assigned or considered as good cause.
See also State v. Dingledine, 28 Ohio Abs. 685, 687-88, 33
N.E.2d 660, 662-63 (App. 1939) (crowded dockets insufficient to establish good cause; saving time and money insufficient; separate trials would cause delay which might deprive a defendant of a speedy trial are insufficient), appeal
dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 251, 20 N.E.2d 6367 (1939).
Administrative and economic reasons for a joint trial were
also rejected in State v. Richardson, 39 Ohio Abs. 608, 613,
54 N.E.2d 160 {App. 1943). The court went on to hold, however, that joinder was proper under the circumstances of
that case because it "enable[d) the jury to have a clearer insight into the testimony and enable[d) it to arrive more intelligently at a proper conclusion." See also State v. Jenkins, 76
Ohio App. 277, 64 N.E.2d 86 (1944) Goint trial permitted
where it appears that all the defendants had planned and
executed the crime and that each had so confessed. The
defendants are not thereby deprived of a fair trial where the
court carefully instructs the jury concerning the application
of the confessions), appeal dismissed, 144 Ohio St. 638, 60
N.E.2d 182 (1945).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the joint trial of
codefendants in an aggravated murder case may be ordered provided the mandates of Rule 14 and R.C. 2945.20
are strictly observed. State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446
N.E.2d 436 (1983). See also State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio
St.2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972) (Absent any necessity
demonstrated in the record for a defendant's trial to run seriatim with the trials of codefendants, a defendant is not de-

nied due process where the state, in order to insure a trial
free from prejudice, conducts separate murder trials simultaneously in different courtrooms.).
Failure to object to joinder in capital cases may constitute
a waiver. See State v. Williams, 85 Ohio App: 236, 88
N.E.2d 20 (1947); State v. Bohannon, 64 Ohio App. 431, 28
N.E.2d 1010 (1940).
MOTION TO SEVER
A motion for relief from prejudicial joinder pursuant to
Criminal Rule 14 is considered a pretrial motion under Rule
12{B)(5). Therefore, the motion must be raised before trial
or the issue is deemed waived unless the defendant can
show good cause for the court to grant relief from the waiver. Furthermore, a request by the defendants for separate
trials is a prerequisite to appeal the issue of failure to order
separate trials. State v. Henry, 4 Ohio St.3d 44, 446 N.E.2d
436 (1983).
In determining whether the confession of one codefendant implicates another, Rule 14 authorizes the court to
order the prosecutor to deliver to the court any statements
made by any of the defendants which are to be introduced
at trial. The basis for such an inspection is Criminal Rule
16{B){1 )(a) which gives the defendant the right to inspect
any relevant statements made by the defendant or his codefendants that are in the possession of the state. This rule of
discovery provides a great advantage to the defendant desiring severance. Without access to a codefendant's confession, provided for in Rule 16(B)(1 )(a), the showing of prejudice necessary for severance under Rule 14 might be exceedingly difficult.
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